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SECTION 434 OF THE WELFARE ACT: DOES THE
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER COLLIDE WITH
THE TENTH AMENDMENT?
INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 1996, fulfilling his campaign promise "to
end welfare as we know it,"' President Clinton signed the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 ("Welfare Act").2 This legislation marks the most com-
prehensive change to federal welfare assistance since it was
established during the Great Depression.3 The Welfare Act
represents a move away from a centralized federal system to
one that gives states more control.4 This change has been
hailed by many state officials as a positive step towards reduc-
ing welfare spending.5
1 142 CONG. REC S9352-01, S9359 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Pre3-
ident Clinton). See also, Statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing
H.R. 3734, 1996 U.S.C.C-A-N. 2891 (Aug. 26, 1996).
2 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
' See, e.g., Robert Pear, State Officials Conclude Some Provisions of the Wel-
fare Law May be Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 30 (noting the
termination of the 61 year-old guaranteed cash assistance for the country's poor).
" The primary method of accomplishing this is by a system of block grants to
be used by states for welfare spending. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 601. Ironically, the grants are subject to a host of restrictions
that facially do not seem to give the states any control over welfare spending at
all. However, such a discussion is outside the scope of this note.
' See David Firestone, Giuliani to Sue Over Provision on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1996, at B1. See also Robert Pear, State Welfare Chiefs Ash for More
U.S. Guidance, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at A16. Not to say that the Welfare
Act has been without its critics. The Welfare Act has frequently been characterized
as mean spirited and especially cruel to children. In fact, several key officials with
the Department of Health and Human Services resigned because they refused to
administer the new legislation calling it mean spirited. See Alison Mitchell, Two
Clinton Aides Resign to Protest New Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at
A6.
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The Welfare Act has also provoked controversies.' Nestled
within its provisions is an amendment to the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. The provision, section 434, provides that
"no State, or local government entity may be prohibited, or in
any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service information regarding
the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States."7 This provision effectively repeals inconsistent
state and local laws on this subject. For example, New York
City's Executive Order 124 ("E.O. 124"), in effect since 1989,
directly prohibits certain city employees from reporting an
individual's alien status.' Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chi-
" See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Pear, supra note 3; Richard C. Reuben, The Welfare Challenge: States Face
Tough Choices and Lawsuits Under the New Act, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 34, 35
(discussing that the "charitable-choice r provision which allows for states to contract
with religious organizations to provide publicly-funded welfare programs conflicts
with earlier Supreme Court decisions that prohibit the use of religious organiza-
tions to provide government services).
8 U.S.C-.A § 1644 (1996).
E Executive Order 124 provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of Information Respecting Aliens.
a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting any
alien to federal immigration authorities unless
(1) such officer's or employee's agency is required by law to disclose infor-
mation respecting such alien, or (2) such agency has been authorized, in
writing signed by such alien, to verify such alien's immigration status, or
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in criminal activi-
ty, including any attempt to obtain public assistance benefits through the
use of fraudulent documents.
b. Each agency shall designate one or more officers or employees who
shall be responsible for receiving reports from such agency's line workers
on aliens suspected of criminal activity and for determining, on a case by
case basis, what action, if any, to take on such reports. No such determi-
nation shall be made by any line worker, nor shall any line worker
transmit information respecting any alien directly to federal immigration
authorities.
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and the De-
partment of Correction, shall continue to cooperate with federal authori-
ties in investigating and apprehending aliens suspected of criminal activi-
ty. However, such agencies shall not transmit to federal authorities infor-
mation respecting any alien who is the victim of a crime.
Section 3. Availability of City Services to Aliens.
Any service provided by a City agency shall be made available to all
aliens who are otherwise eligible for such service unless such agency is
required by law to deny eligibility for such service to aliens. Every City
agency shall encourage aliens to make use of those services provided by
such agency for which aliens are not denied eligibility by law.
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cago have similar regulations.9 Thus, Congress' enactment of
section 434 raises issues of federalism and state sovereignty;
these issues led New York City to file a lawsuit which was
subsequently dismissed in City of New York v. United
States.10
New York City's challenge to section 434 once again focus-
es on ascertaining the limits of federal power vis-a-vis state
sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
has addressed this question under various constitutional provi-
sions with increasing frequency over the past decade.' How-
ever, the limits to Congress' control over immigration and
alienage has yet to be fully delineated.
The key issue in City of New York is whether section 434
violates the Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the
states despite the established broad and exclusive federal pow-
er to regulate immigration and alienage.' On the one hand,
Congress' plenary authority over immigration is so broad and
exclusive that once invoked, it preempts any state law that
regulates immigration or interferes with federal immigration
policy.'" On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that
the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from
directly imposing regulations upon states unless that regula-
tion is generally applicable to all citizens.14 The Court has
also held that the federal government may not commandeer a
state's legislative process so as to turn it into a regulatory arm
43 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 3-01, 3-02 (1995).
' Patrick McDonnell, Welfare Law May Affect Police Role, Immigrants Border:.
Measure Would Allow Public Employees to Report Suspects to LN.S.: Foes Vow to
Fight Provision, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at Al. These laws have alzo been
referred to as sanctuary declarations. See, eg., Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and
State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates, 16 PEPP.
L. REv. 299 (1989).
10 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Since New York City filed suit, Jersey
City, New Jersey has passed a resolution not to cooperate with the federal gov-
ernment on this issue. Miguel Perez, Immigrants' Safe Haven, THE PCORD,
NORTHERN N.J., Oct. 16, 1996, at A03, available in 1996 WL 6112978.
"' See, eg., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, (1987) (Spending Power); US.
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (Commerce Power); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Commerce Power); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Spending and Commerce Powers), Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
12 City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 793-94.
13 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976).
14 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554. But see infra note 132.
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of the federal government.15 Thus, at the heart of New York
City's lawsuit is the uneasy juxtaposition of these doctrines
and the resulting question of whether section 434 usurps the
functions of local legislatures, or merely codifies a pre-existing
federal power. While City of New York court found no Tenth
Amendment violation, the opinion failed to square the federal
immigration power with the Tenth Amendment. 6 Thus, the
conflict between the two doctrines remains unresolved.
This Note will focus on whether Congress, in enacting
section 434, has overextended its power to regulate immigra-
tion and alienage and consequently violated the Tenth Amend-
ment. Part I will analyze whether section 434 is an example of
federal preemption or federal commandeering in light of immi-
gration jurisprudence and Tenth Amendment case law. Part II
will discuss why section 434, while arguably commandeering
states' legislative processes, should be sustained as a valid
exercise of the federal immigration power.
I. SECTION 434: FEDERAL PREEMPTION OR FEDERAL
COMMANDEERING?
The issues in New York City's lawsuit are whether section
434 is a case of valid federal preemption or invalid federal
commandeering. When analyzed in light of Tenth Amendment
case law, section 434 does appear to violate state sovereignty.
However, given the breadth of the federal immigration power
and the necessity for that power to be exclusively vested in the
federal government, the applicability of the Tenth Amendment
is questionable. This is because the federal government's exer-
cise of its immigration power precludes state interference with,
or regulation of, immigration. This is essentially what E. 0.
124 does. Even if section 434 facially usurps New York City's
legislative process, the broader principles of national sovereign-
ty inherent in the federal immigration power require that E.O.
124 cede to federal authority.
1 New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
1 See City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 794.
[Vol. 63: 551
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A. Preemption of E. 0. 124
1. The Broad Federal Power to Regulate Immigration
For well over a century, the Supreme Court has resolved
issues concerning immigration, on the grounds that the power
to regulate immigration and alienage belongs to the federal
government and not the states."7 The Court has repeatedly
stated that "the authority to control immigration-to admit or
exclude aliens-is vested solely in the federal government,""8
and has concluded that congressional power to regulate in this
field is plenary. 9 Congress, therefore, has the exclusive power
to exclude" and remove2' aliens, to set conditions for their
residence in this country' and to restrict or deny benefits to
them.' When viewed in light of this broad federal immigra-
tion power, New York City's enactment of E.O. 124 seems
difficult to justify regardless of the passage of section 434.
In defining the federal power in this field, the Court has
sustained congressional action by citing authority directly from
within as well as outside the text of the Constitution.24 The
Constitution expressly states that Congress has the power to
regulate foreign commerce;' this power has been interpreted
to include the "bringing of persons into the ports of the United
17 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
' Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). The Supreme Court "has
repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens." Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (internal quotes omitted).
,9 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (citing Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strannhan, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
20 See Keindienst, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)
21 See Galvan, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892).
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). It must be noted that the
Supreme Court has been criticized for not thoroughly articulating the source of
federal power in this area resulting in an inconsistent line of precedents. For an
interesting analysis on this theory see, Burt C. Buzan & George M. Deny,
California's Resurrection of the Poor Laws: Proposition 187, Preemption, and the
Peeling Back of the Hollow Onion of Immigration Law, 10 GEO. IW=fGtL L.J. 141
(1996).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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States."26 The Constitution also gives Congress the power to
"establish a uniform rule of naturalization."27 Additionally,
the treaty power has provided a source for federal authority to
regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens and set condi-
tions for their residency.'
The Supreme Court also has found that Congress' power
over immigration and alienage is not exclusively derived from
its enumerated powers and also has relied upon the interna-
tional legal principle that each country is an independent sov-
ereign .29  Thus, the Court has found that the federal
government's power to regulate immigration is "inherent in
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international
relations and defending the country against foreign en-
croachments and dangers.""0 Finally, the Court has deter-
mined that congressional legislation in this field is a political
question rather then one for which judicial determination is
proper.3
The earliest challenges to the exclusive federal power over
immigration were decided on Commerce Clause grounds. The
Commerce Clause gives the federal government the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations,32 and this includes
the regulation of foreign passengers.33 Cases such as Smith v.
21 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 4.
28 See generally Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). The U.S. Constitu-
tion provides that the President has the power to make all treaties with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2. While cases mention
both the Naturalization Clause and treaty power as sources of the federal immi-
gration power, they have not been stressed by the Court as the primary reason
why the federal authority should be broad. Thus they will not be explored in this
Note as sources of federal power. It is enough to mention here that the existence
of these powers serves to bolster the belief that the power to regulate immigration
and alienage should be vested exclusively in the federal government.
29 See, e.g., Ileindienst, 408 U.S. at 767; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
30 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765. See also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711
(holding that "the right to exclude or expel all aliens or any class of aliens, abso-
lutely or upon certain conditions ... [is] an inherent and inalienable right of
every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence
and its welfare . . . ").
31 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which gives Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations . . . . " Id.
' Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712.
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Turner and Norris v. The City of Boston"(commonly referred
to as The Passenger Cases) and Henderson v. Mayor of the City
of New York' struck down state laws because the Supreme
Court found them to intrude upon the federal power over for-
eign commerce. In The Passenger Cases, the Court declared un-
constitutional head taxes imposed by New York City and Bos-
ton on alien passengers who disembarked in those cities.s In
a plurality opinion, the majority of the Justices agreed that
transporting alien passengers was foreign commerce and the
taxes were impermissible state regulations thereofE A more
uniform opinion on the issue was announced in Henderson
when New York City's attempt to have shipmasters pay a head
tax on foreign passengers was invalidated.' New York City
argued that this law, while arguably a regulation of commerce,
was within its "police powers." 9 The Court rejected this argu-
ment' and reaffirmed that regulation of foreign passengers
was within the scope of Congress' exclusive power to regulate
foreign commerce.4' The Court held that because the Consti-
tution gives Congress plenary power to regulate immigration
the Supremacy Clause required federal policy to supersede
contravening state law.'
Over time, however, the Court moved away from focusing
on constitutionally enumerated powers to support the federalimmigration power and toward the principle of national sover-
eignty.' Cases such as Chy Lung v. Freeman and Chae
34 48 U.S. 283 (1848).
92 U.S. 259, 269 (1875).
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 392, 409.
"See, e.g., Justice McLean's opinion stating [t]hat the transportation of pas-
sengers is a part of commerce is not now an open question. gn relied on
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the landmark Commerce Clause case which
held that the federal government, not the states, had the right to regulate navi-
gation between local ports. 48 U.S. at 401. A primary difference among the justic-
es was whether federal regulation of commerce, foreign or interstate, was exclu-
sively vested in the federal government.
92 U.S. at 266. This law differed from the ones struck down in the Passen-
ger Cases as they operated directly on the shipmaster and were not to be collected
from the passengers themselves.
"Id. at 277.
Id. at 271. For the role of state police powers in immigration legislation see
infra Part I.B.
4 Id. at 270.
42 See id. at 272.
' This is also referred to as the theory of the nation-state. See, e.g., Buzan &
1997]
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Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case)"
mark this shift. For example, Chy Lung invalidated a Califor-
nia law that called for a state official to single out foreign pas-
sengers who were deemed "undesirable" and required
shipmasters to pay a bond for those who fell into that class.4"
Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, was immensely trou-
bled that a state official could decide which passengers were
"improper."4 7 The Court declared that such power must belong
to Congress because otherwise a single state could "embroil us
in disastrous quarrels with other nations."5
The Chinese Exclusion Case solidified the principle that
federal authority over immigration is grounded both within
and outside the text of the Constitution. This case dealt with
the validity of a congressional act that prohibited Chinese
laborers from entering the United States.49 The Court con-
cluded that Congress could so exclude classes of aliens." This
power, according to the Court, was a necessary incident of
national sovereignty, and was granted "to the government of
the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegat-
ed by the Constitution."51
Nearly a century later, in Toll v. Moreno,52 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its position that the federal immigration
power has its roots in both constitutionally enumerated powers
and principles of national sovereignty. In Toll it was declared
that "federal authority to regulate the status of aliens derives
from various sources, including the federal government's power
[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization, its power [tlo
Derry, supra note 24.
" 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
4' 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
46 Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 276-77. An immigrant was determined undesirable if
perceived to be either a lunatic, lewd, deaf or likely to become a public charge. Id.
47 Id. The tax was struck down on the same grounds as in Henderson. Id. at
278-79.
48 Id.
'9 130 U.S. at 583.
'0 Id. at 609. The Court, in its opinion, made the blanket statement that "the
government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department,
can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open
to controversy." Id. at 603.
5' Id. at 609.
12 458 U.S. 1 (1980).
[Vol. 63:551
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regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and its broad author-
ity over foreign affairs."'
Stemming from this principle of national sovereignty is the
Supreme Court's posture of limited judicial inquiry into acts
carried out under the federal immigration power. As such, the
Court has sustained the right of the federal government to
establish residency requirements and expel immigrants for
noncompliance, as in Fong Yue Ting;64 to deport a twenty-
year resident immigrant because he was once a member of the
Communist Party, as in Galvan v. Press;' and deny entry to
an acknowledged Marxist scholar, as in Kliendienst v.
Mandel." These cases were all decided under the theory that
such determinations, because they pertain to or affect interna-
tional relations, are political acts entrusted to Congress.'
They have come to stand for the proposition that not only is
the federal power over immigration extremely broad but it is
also intimately linked to political decision-making and not
judicial determination." Thus, it is established that "t]he
power to exclude aliens is inherent in sovereignty, necessary
for maintaining normal international relations and defending
the country from foreign encroachments and dangers-a power
to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of govern-
ment."9
In contrast to the deference given to federal acts, is the
Supreme Court's scrutiny of state legislation in this arena. The
distinctive approaches used in analyzing the constitutionality
Id. at 10 (internal quotes omitted).
5' In this case several Chinese immigrants challenged the federal government's
right to expel them for not complying with federal residency requirements. 149
U.S. at 702-04.
347 U.S. 522, 523 (1954).
56 408 U.S. 753 (1972). See also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.. 118 (1967) (federal
government may exclude homosexuals); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (alien's detention at Ellis Island was withiri the federal
government rights).
" See, e.g., Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531. Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion for the
Court, concluded with the following thought 'We are not prepared to deem our-
selves wiser or more sehsitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially
those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitu-
tion, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional
power in dealing with aliens." Id. at 531-532; See also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
713.
56 See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84.
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765 (internal quotes omitted).
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of federal and state immigration legislation reinforces the
exclusivity of the federal regulatory power. For example, in
Fong Yue Ting the Court declined to apply the reasoning of
Chy Lung, which invalidated a state immigration regulation, to
a federal immigration act.6° The Court noted that "the ques-
tion [in Chy Lung] was of the power of a State over aliens
continuing to reside within its jurisdiction, not of the power of
the United States to put an end to their residence in the coun-
try."6
1
However, simply because the Court has drawn a distinc-
tion between state and federal acts in this field does not mean
states lack. authority to legislate. While the Court continually
has articulated the principle that the federal government's
power over immigration is dominant and extremely broad, 2 it
also has recognized the concomitant need for states to be able
to address local problems that may occur as the result of aliens
residing within their borders.' Many states have stressed
this recognition in attempts to use their police power to cir-
cumvent the broad federal authority over immigration.'
While the Court has struck down almost all such state legisla-
tion as an impermissible intrusion,65 it also has articulated
certain instances when a state law can co-exist with a federal
law in this arena.66 Since the Court has found that some state
laws may not interfere with the federal immigration power, it
is easy to understand why New York City believes that it has
some authority to enact regulations that touch upon the field
of immigration and alienage.
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of some state
authority, state immigration legislation in this field has been
upheld only under limited circumstances.' Thus, when a
state interfered with a non-citizen's ability to be employed, 8
60 149 U.S. at 724-25.
61 Id.
62 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 n.23 (1982); Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1982); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217
(1923).
" See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
65 Id.
See infra Text, pages 12-13.
See De Canas, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Terrace, 263 U.S. at 217.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
[Vol. 63: 551
FEDERAL M3fIGRATION POWER
or ran a program of alien registration,9 or denied aliens a
fishing license,7" imposed residency or citizenship require-
ments to obtain welfare benefits,7 or denied in-state universi-
ty tuition benefits to resident legal immigrants 2 the Court
found incompatibility with the federal immigration power.73
These state laws were all held to be federally preempted be-
cause they stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.'
The common thread running through these cases is the
Court's finding that the states' acts intruded upon the broad
federal immigration power by imposing burdens on aliens
beyond those imposed by the federal government. Thus, when
Arizona tried to deny employment to non-citizens, the Court in
Traux held this regulation impermissible because it was "tan-
tamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance
and abode.' Similar reasoning was applied to overturn state
laws in Takahashi and Graham. As the Court stated in
Takahashi, "[the States] can neither add nor take from the
conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, natu-
ralization and residence of aliens in the United States."
With these decisions the Court broadened the federal power
over immigration and alienage to reach intrastate activities."
6' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, (1941).
To Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
71 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Arizona law required resi-
dent aliens to have lived in the state for fifteen years. Id. at 367. Pennsylvania
required recipients to be U.S. citizens. Id. at 368. But sea Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976). The Mathews Court held that a five-year waiting period for re3i-
dent aliens to obtain federal welfare benefits was not unconstitutional because it
was rationally related to the legislative end of regulating immigration. The Court
distinguished Graham, declaring that while 'a division by a State of the category
of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United State3
citizens and aliens has no apparent justification whereas a comparable classifica-
tion by the federal government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its
business." Id. at 85.
72 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. at 3.
See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 378; Truax, 239 U.S. at 42.
74 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
' Truax, 239 U.S. at 42.
76 334 U.S. at 419.
' It is interesting that the Court, while willing to aclmowledge that a state
law that affected immigration and alienage unconstitutionally interfered with feder-
al regulation as early 1848's The Passenger Cases, was reluctant to extend this
logic into other areas of federal regulation until decades later. See, e.g., Hammer
v. Dagenhart which held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal govern-
1997]
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The states, however, may properly legislate in this field if
certain guidelines are met. In the defining decision of De
Canas v. Bica,78 a state law dealing with immigration was
sustained as a valid exercise of its police power. There, the
Court confronted a California law that penalized employers
who hired illegal immigrants in violation of federal stan-
dards. 9 The Court declared that the statute was within the
state's police power and was not preempted simply because it
dealt with immigrants. 0 In deciding De Canas, the Court laid
out a three-prong test for determining federal preemption of a
state statute pertaining to immigration.
First, the state law may not regulate immigration."' This
is "essentially the determination of who should or should not
be admitted into the country and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain."82 The California law was deemed
not regulatory but simply an economy strengthening policy
providing criminal sanctions against employers who violated
federal standards. 3 Second, a permissible state law touching
the field of immigration may be preempted by a clear federal
directive." The Court found no explicit federal directive that
would preempt the California law." Finally, the state law
may not serve "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."86 This
issue was remanded for further determination if the law stood
ment from using the commerce power to regulate intrastate manufacturing. 247
U.S. 251 (1918) (overturned by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). This diver-
gence further demonstrates the Court's recognition that federal legislation should
take precedence in this field.
78 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
79 Id. at 352-53.
so Id. at 355-56. The Court stated that it has never held "that every state
enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and
thus per se preempted by [the federal constitutional power to regulate immigra-
tion], whether latent or exercised." Id. at 355.
:I Id. at 355-63.
82 Id. at 355.
"s De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. The Court noted that "absent congressional ac-
tion [the state law] would not be an invalid incursion on federal power." Id.
84 Id. at 356.
8' Id. at 357. The Court stated that it would not presume that "Congress, in
enacting the INA [Immigration and Naturalization Act], intended to oust state
authority to regulate the employment relationship. . . in a manner consistent
with pertinent federal laws." Id.
86 Id. at 363 (citing Hines, 312 U.S at 67).
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as an obstacle to federal legislation.' The De Canas three-
prong test now serves as the guidepost for determining the
states' ability to enact legislation dealing with aliens and im-
migration.s"
2. Federal Preemption of E.O. 124
New York City's complaint alleged that section 434 violat-
ed the Tenth Amendment because it commands the city to
carry out a federal policy. 9 The difficulty in finding a clear
Tenth Amendment violation is that section 434 was enacted
under Congress' broad immigration power. The Court has long
held that the power to regulate immigration is "necessarily
very broad, touching as it does basic aspects of national sover-
eignty, more particularly our foreign relations and national
security."0 Since it is the exclusive right of the federal gov-
ernment to remove illegal immigrants who have been perceived
as invaders violating our national security,9 is it not also the
federal government's prerogative to take the steps necessary to
remove those invaders? If so, then section 434 is simply a
means reasonably adapted to the legitimate end of regulating
immigration. Therefore, E.O. 124 must cede to federal authori-
ty as an impermissible regulation or obstruction of immigra-
tion policy.
In light of De Canas, E.O. 124 appears to be subject to
federal preemption as both an impermissible regulation of
immigration and as an obstacle to the exercise of the federal
authority. Arguably, E.O. 124 does not regulate immigration
since it directs its employees not to become involved with an
alien's residency status. However, no Supreme Court decision
limits the proscription of state regulation in immigration law
to placing burdens upon aliens. In fact, Takashi held that a
87 Id. at 364-65.
' See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768
(C.D. Cal. 1995). See also Garcia v. Louisiana, 521 So. 2d 608, 613-14 (La. App.
1988).
See City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 795 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).




state may neither add to, nor reduce, those conditions placed
on aliens by the federal government. 2 The city regulation, by
easing the burden on illegal immigrants to avoid deportation,
lessens the conditions imposed on them by the federal govern-
ment.
Furthermore, De Canas also forbids local regulations to
stand as an obstacle to federal goals in regulating immigra-
tion." The federal government's policies are to remove incen-
tives for undocumented persons to remain in this country,94
and "bar undesirable aliens from our shores."" Despite such
policies, many illegal immigrants have taken up residence
creating a "'shadow population' of illegal migrants."" Section
434 promotes the federal goal of deterring illegal migration,
where E.O. 124 frustrates this goal by making it more difficult
for Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") agents to
locate illegal immigrants. Thus, section 434 may be regarded
as an expression of direct federal preemption, because it aims
to eliminate this obstacle.
Nevertheless, New York City attempts to circumvent the
federal immigration power by alleging that section 434 under-
mines its policy to protect its residents by allowing illegal
immigrants to obtain vital services.' For example, E. 0. 124
92 334 U.S. at 419. Of course, the Court was passing on the issue of legal
immigrants. However, the Court has decided that a state may not take away
certain rights from those illegally present in this country. Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (holding that a state may not prohibit the children of illegal immi-
grants from obtaining a public education). Whether the Court would strike down a
regulation such as E.O. 124, which includes in its purpose the desire to ensure
that illegal immigrant parents send their children to school without fear of being
reported to the INS does pose an interesting question.
's De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 362 (1976).
14 This federal policy is clearly stated in the amendments to the INA passed in
the Welfare Act. Congress has stated that "jilt is a compelling government interest
to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of
public benefits." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1601(6) (1996). See also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1996)
(prohibiting illegal immigrants to obtain welfare assistance); 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1324a(a)(1)(A) and (B) (making the employment and continued employment of
illegal aliens a federal crime); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1996) (including undocu-
mented aliens in the group of deportable aliens).
9 Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1975) (prominent musician facing
deportation because of drug possession conviction in country of origin).
' Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.
New York City avers in its complaint that by prohibiting the city's continued
implementation of E.O. 124 the health and safety of all of its residents is greatly
endangered. Illegal aliens who witness crimes or are victims of crimes need to be
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ensures that undocumented children obtain an education to re-
duce their risk of becoming criminals or dependent upon public
assistance." The city's complaint also alleges that illegal
aliens commingle with legal residents, and that like all city
residents, they may be victims or witnesses of a crime or ex-
posed to a serious disease."' E. 0. 124 assists the city in in-
vestigating and rectifying these situations by providing pro-
tection to such illegal immigrants. 10
While these allegations may demonstrate New York City's
need for enacting E. 0. 124, they do not overcome preemption
by the federal government's use of its immigration power. The
Supreme Court's rationale behind federal preemption ac-
knowledges that a state may have a valid purpose for wanting
to avoid federal preemption;0 2 however, "even state regula-
tion designed to protect vital state interests must give way to
paramount federal legislation."' As stated in Hines, a local
law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress is the
hallmark of federal preemption."""4 This is certainly the case
with E.O. 124. The federal government's goal is to deter illegal
aliens from taking up residency and remove those who have
entered illegally.' 5 Since E.O. 124 stands as an obstacle to
that policy, a forceful argument can be made that E.O. 124 was
always unconstitutional and section 434 simply articulates
what is already in the federal province.
free to report such activities to the police. The sick must feel free to obtain health
services and parents must feel free to send their children to school If illegal im-
migrants fear deportation, the city will be unable to fully carry out its duty to




100 Id. 18, 20.
101 Id. I 21. For example, the city points out that in order for its health de-
partment to adequately identify sources of communicable diseases, such as tuber-
culosis, it must have cooperation from all city residents, including undocumented
aliens. Complaint I 21.
" See, eg., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230-32 (1947) (state
scheme regulating grain while traditionally occupied by state3 was preempted by
federal law).
103 De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357.
104 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
10 See supra note 94.
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The recent invalidation of California's Proposition 187 is
illustrative of E.O. 124s subjection to federal preemption as an
improper regulation of immigration. The California law, a
mirror image of New York City's E.O. 124, mandated that local
officials investigate individuals' immigration status and report
to the INS those suspected to be here illegally."6 The district
court, applying the De Canas test, struck down Proposition 187
in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson.. on
the ground that the reporting provision effectuates the removal
of immigrants and thereby regulates immigration."8 It was
considered an impermissible regulation under De Canas be-
cause the statute allowed for state officers to, in effect, deter-
mine who should remain in this country.0 9 The court con-
cluded that the California law created a "comprehensive
scheme" to detect and report the presence and effect the re-
moval of illegal aliens and thereby regulated immigration."0
E.O. 124 effectuates a similar end. By prohibiting its em-
ployees from cooperating with the INS, New York City has also
established a "comprehensive scheme" that essentially makes a
determination as to who may stay in this country and under
what conditions. Such an act runs afoul of the principles laid
out in De Canas and the established immigration authority of
the federal government. Thus, E.O. 124 may be preempted as
an improper regulation of immigration.
B. Is Section 434 a Case of Federal Commandeering?
Given the well established, broad federal power to control
immigration there would seem to be no basis for New York
City's lawsuit. However, in analyzing recent Supreme Court
opinions concerning the Tenth Amendment, the City's com-
plaint becomes understandable. Within the past several years
the Tenth Amendment has taken a more expansive role as the
" League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 76.3 (Cal.
D.C. 1995).
'7 Id. at 771.





Supreme Court has curbed federal powers to preserve state
sovereignty. The history of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
and recent application of this amendment indicate why New
York City may reasonably argue that section 434 is a violation
of state sovereignty.
1. Tenth Amendment Principles
The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."'' Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Darby" interpreted the Tenth Amendment as "noth-
ing but a truism.""' As such, the Court has been highly def-
erential to acts of Congress and permitted regulation of a vari-
ety of intrastate activities."4 This includes, in certain in-
stances, regulation of various state government functions."u
This approach remained fairly consistent until the Supreme
Court opinion of New York v. United States."6
The line of cases leading up to New York all wrestled with
the concept of whether the Tenth Amendment served as an
affirmative limit to use of Congress' enumerated powers vis-h-
vis the States."7 Clearly, the rights of the states are not im-
peded by proper federal regulation of private activity. This
proposition was established by the Court when it upheld the
constitutionality of federal regulation of private employers'
wages and hours in Darby on the grounds that the Tenth
Amendment did not deprive Congress the authority to regulate
intrastate activity if it fell within the exercise of a granted
"I U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
112 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
113 Id, at 124.
"' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (citing Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant refusing to serve African-Americans
food affects interstate commerce and thus subject to federal regulation) and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (farmer's overproduction of wheat affected
interstate commerce and subject to federal regulation)).
1"5 See, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(commerce power included regulation of state wages).
116 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
117 Darby, 312 U.S. at 123-24; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 US. 833,
845 (1976); New York, 505 U.S. at 176-78.
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power.'18 However, while the Court has had little trouble ap-
plying Congress' powers to intrastate affairs involving private
individuals, it has not been as definitive in deciding how feder-
al powers relate to state activity. This is best exemplified by
the Court's shift in its position from National League of Cities
v. Usery" to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority.2 ° It is also seen in the differences between Garcia
and New York v. United States' and, more recently, Printz
v. United States.2 2
In Usery, the Supreme Court found that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA7) could not be applied to state employ-
ees.' The Court determined that the Tenth Amendment pre-
vented such legislation because it sought to regulate the
"states as states"24 and thus interfered with "traditional gov-
ernment fimctions.""25 The Court held that the FLSA, by re-
quiring states to pay their employees according to federal stan-
dards, "significantly alter[ed] or displace[d] the state's ability
to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, [and] public
health."26 These types of activities had long been held to be
integral to the function of the state government.27 The Court
concluded the federal government had no authority to regulate
such activities when the federal interest was not strong enough
to justif-y state submission.128
However, Usery's "traditional government function" ap-
proach turned out to be unworkable, because it left too much
room for judicial discretion and resulted in an inconsistent line
of precedents." Less than a decade later it was overruled in
118 Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. The act in question was the Fair Labor Standard
Act (FLSA) which was enacted under the Federal commerce power. Id. at 109-111.
11 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
12 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
121 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
12 117 S. Ct 2365 (1996).
' Usery, 426 U.S. at 852. (involved an amendment to the FLSA that applied





L' Usery, 426 U.S. at 855.
For example, the Court -distinguished the payment of wages and setting
hours by a state from state retirement requirements in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority when
the Court determined that the FLSA could be applied to an
arm of a state.30 In Garcia, the Court held that the Tenth
Amendment is not implicated if the federal law applies to state
and private entities alike.'3' Once this prerequisite is met,
state sovereignty is afforded protection by the very structure of
the federal system.'32
Of course, when the federal legislature acts solely upon
the state, there may be a Tenth Amendment violation. This
was the case in New York v. United States, where a federal
statute required states to either regulate nuclear waste accord-
ing to federal regulations or take title to the waste and face
penalties." It held this to be an unconstitutional intrusion
into state sovereignty," because the federal government had
enacted legislation that effectively commandeered the state
legislatures to implement a federal program.'" This "no-com-
mandeering principle" was central to the Supreme Court's
decision. The Court stated that the federal government may
not directly require states to regulate according to a federal
plan. 6 The Court found the Tenth Amendment violated be-
cause such action turns the states into regulatory agencies for
the federal government.' It reasoned that if states could be
forced to legislate according to federal dictates then voters
would be unable to hold the responsible political body account-
U.S. 226 (1983) (finding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act permissibly
applied to state employers as it did not violate state sovereignty as much as mini-
mum wage regulation).
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
121 Id. at 554.
11 Id. at 552. Note, however, that the Court has recently hinted that even in
the case of a generally applicable law it might be possible to violate state sover-
eignty if the law "excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments."
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382. How excessive is, of course, open to question.
New York, 505 U.S. at 174-75.
Id. at 175-76.
13 Id. at 174-76. The Court stated that: "We have always understood that even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit those acts." Id. at 166. Thus, while an "allocation of power contained
in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate
commerce directly;, it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments'
regulation of interstate commerce." Id.




able.' Without a clear line of accountability, the Tenth
Amendment's protection of citizens was eroded,' because,
ultimately citizens can only be protected when authority is
properly divided between state and federal governments. 4 '
Since deciding New York, the Supreme Court has further
defined the "no commandeering" rule in Printz v. United
States."" In Printz, a Tenth Amendment challenge was made
to the "interim provisions," of the Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act ("Brady Act").' It was argued that the Brady
Act's requirement that a state's law enforcement officers run
background checks on firearm applicants impedes upon state
sovereignty.' In resolving this issue the Supreme Court held
that the Tenth Amendment is equally violated when the feder-
al government commands a state's officers as when it com-
mands its legislature.' 4 The Court reaffirmed its position
that any requirement by the federal government that the state
carry out a federal regulatory program is an anathema to the
Tenth Amendment and federalist principles. 4 ' This also in-
cludes laws that are seemingly ministerial and do not interfere
with state policymaking.'
" New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. The Court found that Act's "take title" provi-
sion forced state officials to either select a disposal site or let the federal govern-
ment select one within the state. This created a situation where a state official
would be more likely to turn that decision over to the federal government rather
then be made accountable for the location selected. The Court found that "[wlhere
state officials purport to submit to the direction of Congress in this manner, feder-
alism is hardly being advanced." Id. at 183.
1 Id. at 182-83.
1 Id. at 181.
14 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
.42 Id. at 2369. The challenged provision of the Brady Act involved an interim
provision of the law which requires local law enforcement to determine whether a
firearm may be transferred to an applicant. Id. at 2368-69.
'4 Id. at 2369-70.
1" Id. at 2372.
14 Id.
'46 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court refused to accept the Government's
argument that the interim provision only required a modicum of policymaking
assistance from local officers. The Court stated that even if the Brady Act "leaves
no 'policymaking' discretion with the States, we fail to see how that improves
rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty. Preservation of the
States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably less under-
mined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than . .. by reducling]




2. E.O. 124 and Tenth Amendment Principles of State
Sovereignty
If the current judicial landscape did not include a leaning
of the Court in favor of state sovereignty then the argument of
section 434!s constitutionality would end with a simple discus-
sion of the federal preemption of state legislation dealing with
immigrants. Simply put, the New York City regulation, in light
of De Canas, would be directly preempted by virtue of the
enactment of section 434.147 However, given the recent Su-
preme Court interpretations of the Tenth Amendment, such an
analysis would fall short of determining section 434's constitu-
tionality. Therefore, section 434 must be analyzed in light of
current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
In order to determine if section 434 violates the Tenth
Amendment it must be determined whether the federal act
impermissibly coerces the City to legislate or regulate accord-
ing to federal dictates.148 New York City's complaint against
the federal government alleges that section 434:
(1) [d]irectly probibit[s] States and localities from engaging in the
central sovereign process of passing laws or otherwise determining
policy; and (2)... usurp(s) State's and local governments' adminis-
tration of core functions of government, including the provision of
police protection and regulation of their own workforces, in a statute
that is not of general applicability."'
However, these allegations, as was pointed out in City of New
York v. United States, misinterpret Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence and the no commandeering standard.
The basis of the Supreme Court's opinions in New York
and Printz were that the federal mandates at issue resulted in
making states regulatory arms of the federal government. At
first blush, it seems that section 434 makes New York City a
regulatory agency for the federal government. Despite section
434's creation of only a voluntary exchange of information
between local and federal officers, there may be a resulting
cost to New York City.5 This is because compliance would
* See supra text accompanying notes 78-88.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-144.Complaint 9I 2.
The House Conference Report provides, in part, that § 434 "does not require,
in and of itself, any government agency or law enforcement official to communicate
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result in the city's inability to prevent its employees from
spending time and resources supplying answers to federal
requests.15' This, the City alleges, interferes with the its abil-
ity to regulate its own workforce,'52 and forces the city to be-
come entangled with federal immigration policy. Furthermore,
section 434 provides the city with no choice but to respond to
federal demands. In responding to that demand the city may
be improperly forced to risk accepting the blame for providing
misinformation."3 This blurring of accountability is precisely
what concerned the Supreme Court in New York and
Printz.154
However, section 434 does not require any and all city
employees to respond to an INS request for information re-
garding the identity of illegal aliens residing within New York
City. Instead, the law simply allows for a voluntary exchange
between state/local and federal officials.'55 As the court in
City of New York concluded, while section 434 "can be charac-
terized as interfering with a City policy that prevents its offi-
cials from cooperating with federal immigration authorities
except in accordance with certain procedures, that effect on
local policy is not the type of intrusion that is sufficient to
with the INS." City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 792. In Printz, the Supreme
Court hinted that a federal law requiring a voluntary exchange of information
between federal and state authorities would not violate the Tenth Amendment.
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct., 2365, 2376 (1996). See also, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence noting that "the Court appropriately refrain[ed] from deciding whether
other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and
local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid."
Id. at 2385.
151 However, note that a federal law that requires a state to expend funds is
not indicative of federal commandeering if it is simply a necessary consequence of
a valid federal regulation. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988).
152 Complaint g 2.
"5 The court in City of New York argued that the City could escape such blame
by claiming that it was merely carrying out a federal mandate. 971 F. Supp. at
797. This argument, however, misinterprets the effects of § 434 on local govern-
ments. If a New York City employee provides misinformation to the INS, it is not
the federal government who will be at risk of blame, but the City itself. If the
federal government declines responsibility for being given incorrect information,
and the only redress the City has is to claim compliance with § 434, accountabili-
ty is surely blurred. It is precisely this type of mutual fingerpointing that con-
cerned the Supreme Court in New York. See 505 U.S. at 168-69.
154 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1996).
155 City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 795.
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violate the Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism." "=r
Further buttressing this position is the Supreme Courts nota-
ble abstention from deciding whether federal laws which mere-
ly allow for the exchange of information with the federal gov-
ernment would constitute impermissible commandeering. 7
Nor is a blurring of political accountability on its own a
basis for finding a Tenth Amendment violation.' Instead, it
is the act of the federal government mandating that the state
or its officers implement a federal program that gives rise to
Tenth Amendment protections. That accountability is blurred
is merely an aspect of the Supreme Court's rationale when
"concluding that Congress lacks the power to compel states to
regulate or to conscript state and local officers in carrying out
a federal program."'59 As the court in City of New York has
artfully pointed out, any allowance of political accountability as
a basis for striking down a federal law would lead to challeng-
es of congressional statutes that properly preempt state laws
"on 'political accountability' grounds because state officials
could be blamed for changing or not implementing their
laws."'60
New York City further alleges that section 434 violates the
Tenth Amendment, because it prohibits "the City from engag-
ing in the central sovereign process of passing laws or other-
wise adopting a policy that prohibits or restricts its officials
from sending information to the INS"' and undermines the
City's ability "control its own workforce." '6A state's sover-
eignty certainly includes the duty to make decisions and set
policy.'s However, the Supreme Court no longer holds that
the Tenth Amendment is implicated simply because some state
policy is displaced."6 Nor has the Court held that the Tenth
156 Id.
11 See supra note 150.




16 Complaint 1 45.
163 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The FERC Court established
that '[w]hatever the outer limits of state sovereignty may be, it surely encompass-
es the right to set the duties of office for state-created officials and to regulate the
internal affairs of government bodies." Koog v. U.S., 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 761).
164 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S.
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Amendment is trammeled when a state must rewrite policy in
order to comply with proper federal legislation."6
Even if section 434 is an example of impermissible federal
commandeering, such a finding would not support the striking
down of section 434. This is because the provision directly
relates to Congress' control of immigration, a power vested
exclusively in the federal government. Concededly, it is under-
standable why New York City claims that section 434
impermissibly intrudes upon its state sovereignty given recent
interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. However, principles
of state sovereignty should have a unique place in determining
the use of the federal immigration power.' This is because
the federal immigration power "is subsumed under the general
topic[s] of foreign affairs"'67 and national sovereignty and
thereby requires that issues of state sovereignty be subordinat-
ed. 6
8
II. THE CONTROLLING POWER
The tension that exists between the federal immigration
power and Tenth Amendment principles requires courts to look
elsewhere to solve the problems posed by section 434. Ulti-
mately, what must be decided is whether the need to require a
broad and exclusive federal immigration power can co-exist
with principles of state sovereignty. Interestingly enough, the
court in City of New York v. United States refrained from ad-
dressing the role that the federal immigration power truly
plays. "'69 This is unfortunate. Rather then look for a resolu-
tion using solely Tenth Amendment and federalism principles,
264, 291 (1981) (offering states a regulatory role in fields subject to federal pre-
emption does not violate the Tenth Amendment).
' See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988).
16 See infra Part II.
,6 Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (D.N.M. 1980)
(state university's policy of denying admission of foreign students whose home
government permits the holding of United States' citizens hostage intruded upon
the federal immigration power).
' See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
... The court did briefly mention the federal government's plenary power over
immigration but concluded that this was not the issue to be decided in this case.
971 F. Supp. 789, 793-94.
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the court should have recognized the unique position the feder-
al immigration power occupies in America's federalist system.
The passage of section 434 creates a clash of two strong
Constitutional principles. It has long been recognized that the
federal government has been "vested by the Constitution with
the entire control of international relations,"'7 and this pow-
er necessarily includes the "exclusive responsibility for immi-
gration matters."71 The Supreme Court has also acknowl-
edged the need for states to be able to preserve their sovereign-
ty by not being subjected to federal coercion. 2 Paradoxically,
the rationale behind preserving both principles is one and the
same. Both the development of a strong, unified federal immi-
gration power and a system of dual sovereignties were put into
place to better protect individual citizens. Perhaps in dealing
with this matter it should be kept in mind the belief expressed
by Thomas Jefferson, who on the whole did not favor broad
federal powers, "that the States should severally preserve their
sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and that
whatever may concern.., any foreign nation, should be made
a part of federal sovereignty."'73
In vesting the federal government with its various powers,
the Framer's recognized the necessity to maintain in one uni-
fied government all those powers that pertain to foreign rela-
tions.7 4 The Framers were concerned with the Articles of
Confederation lack of any single authority to handle foreign af-
fairs,'75 and thereby adopted a system where such powers
would belong exclusively to the federal government." It was
believed that in matters pertaining to foreign relations "one
general government... most favors the safety of the peo-
170 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1812).
1 League of Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 769. See also supra Part
IA
" See supra Part IA
1 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 n.11 (1941) (citing a letter from Jeffer-
son to Mr. Wythe).
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
175 See Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to
Foreign Nationals Hosted by the United States, 23 COLULL HULL RS. L. REV. 315,
334 (1992).
"7' Justice Black in Hines, noted that Alexander Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist No. 80 that "[t]he peace of the whole ought not to be left at the dispos-
al of a part. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the
conduct of its members." Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 n.12.
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pie."'77 This is because a unified federal power better "pre-
serve[s] the people in a state of peace with other nations."178
It is also the reason why the federal government is vested with
power to make treaties, send ambassadors, regulate foreign
commerce and proscribe uniform rules of naturalization. 179
These powers are by necessity controlled by the federal gov-
ernment because of their connection to foreign affairs. 8 '
Foreign relations handled by one unified government also
best maintains the nation's "absolute independence and securi-
ty throughout the entire territory." 8' To allow the states to
enter this field would ignore this long-standing policy. The
United States is a union of individual states that is represent-
ed to foreign persons and governments by a single authority
that "is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs with foreign sovereignties."182 The
Court has stated that these powers are best left to the federal
government so as to "preserve [the country's] independence,
and give security against foreign aggression and encroach-
ment.., and to attain these ends nearly all other consider-
ations are to be subordinated." "e
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a delinea-
tion between what is constitutionally permissible vis-&-vis
internal affairs and vis-A-vis external affairs.'" In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court placed issues
of foreign affairs outside the realm of the Tenth Amend-
ment.' The Court reasoned that while "the federal govern-
ment can exercise no powers except those specifically enumer-
ated in the Constitution. . . , [this] is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs."8 6 As to the exercise of exter-
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 3 at 16 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 n.13 (citing to THE FEDERALIST No.3 (John Jay)).
179 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
180 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 42 supra note 170.
151 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604.
1 Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
1 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
' See United States v. Curtis Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1 Id. at 315-16. In Curtis-Wright, the Court assumed, without deciding, that a
joint resolution delegating legislative authority to the executive branch in the area
of internal affairs would be invalid. Nevertheless, because the measure at issue




nal affairs, the states never possessed such powers and there-
fore it can not be said that federal regulation over the states in
this field somehow takes away from the states' independent
sovereignty. 87 This separation of roles, taken together with
the Court's consistent tying of the federal immigration power
to federal control over foreign affairs, logically leads to the con-
clusion that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the federal
government's power over immigration.
It is not, however, accurate to state that the Tenth
Amendment should never play a role in determining the feder-
al government's action in the field of immigration regulation.
Certainly, if the federal government were to require a state to
actively seek out and deport illegal aliens, then the Tenth
Amendment would be violated. However, when dealing with
issues of immigration, like all issues of foreign affairs, the
rights of the states should be balanced against the need to
preserve federal unanimity in dealing with foreign affairs.
While federal commandeering of a state government is imper-
missible,ethe federal immigration power poses unique issues
of rights of the nation as a sovereign. Upon determining if the
federal government has intruded upon state sovereignty, it
must first be ascertained if the federal act best serves the
national interest in preserving a unanimous front to deal with
foreign entities. This balancing of policies is consistent with
both the underlying policies of federal immigration and Tenth
Amendment principles.
As already stated, the basis for the exclusive federal immi-
gration power is the allowance for protection of individual
rights. The same policy is present in the need to preserve the
federalist system. The Framers recognized the need to create
and preserve state sovereignty and protect it from federal
encroachment." 9 This system of dual sovereignties provides
for a "decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society," and ensures "the
protection of our fundamental liberties."'
1 See id. at 316-18.
U3 New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
,8 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-52.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (holding that the Federal Age




However, the Tenth Amendment should not impair the
federal government's ability to regulate immigration in a uni-
form fashion. It is a power that is "intimately blended and
intertwined with responsibilities of the national govern-
ment."9 ' Undoubtedly, the seemingly unending stream of il-
legal migration burdens the states. However, while the Su-
preme Court has refused to "conclude that the States are with-
out any power to deter the influx of persons entering...
against federal law, and... might have a discernible impact
on traditional state concerns,"'92 the immigration power must
supersede the Tenth Amendment's concerns of state sovereign-
ty. Therefore, any attempts by states to circumvent federal
dominance in this field must continue to be considered in light
of the need to preserve federal authority over immigration. 93
It is true that "the Tenth Amendment provides a shield
against the federal exercise of powers reserved to the
states."'94 However, in the case of section 434, the federal
government is not exercising a power reserved to the states.
Instead, it is exercising a power vested exclusively in the fed-
eral government; a power vested by the people to ensure their
safety.'95 Thus, when it comes to acts under the federal immi-
gration power, the Tenth Amendment shield must be balanced
against the need to preserve federal autonomy in the field of
foreign affairs.
- Hines, 312 U.S. at 66.
2 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23.
See text accompanying notes 171-180.
' New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis add-
ed). New Jersey is one of several cases in which states have charged that the
federal government's inability to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the
United States has led to a Tenth Amendment violation. The states argue that
because of the federal government's failure to control the borders the states are
forced to spend a large portion of their resources on welfare funding and facilities
such as schools and jails. Not one circuit court opinion has ruled in favor of the
states and has interpreted New York's "no commandeering" principle to extend
only to prohibiting affirmative directives laid out by the federal government. See
also Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); and Chiles v. United
States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).




The Supreme Court has characterized issues regarding the
scope of federal power and the limits placed by the Tenth
Amendment as simply mirror images of one another."
Therefore, New York City's lawsuit will permit a forum to
determine the breadth of the federal immigration power. How-
ever, while section 434 can easily be portrayed as an example
of impermissible federal commandeering, this Tenth Amend-
ment principle has a limited role in light of the federal immi-
gration power.
The federal government's power over immigration is just
one facet of its exclusive control over all foreign matters. It is a
power, however, that is part and parcel of the power over ex-
ternal affairs. To ignore this aspect, and subject this power to
the same Tenth Amendment limits as domestic federal powers,
is to undermine the basis of our national sovereignty. Thus,
while it may at times reduce a state's authority within its
borders, federal regulation of immigration must remain in the
hands of one unified government.
Allison B. Feld
6 New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
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